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LOSER-PAYS: WHERE NEXT?
WALTER OLSON*
DAVID BERNSTEIN**
INTRODUCTION
Recent legislative developments at both the federal and state
levels have focused new attention on the loser-pays rule, under which
the side that loses an adversary civil proceeding must pay some or all
of the winner's fees and expenses.' The rule appears to be in effect in
most if not all jurisdictions outside the United States,2 and its advan-
tages are manifold. Most obviously, it discourages speculative litiga-
tion-among the most persistent problems facing the American
litigation system-and it limits the tactical leverage parties with weak
cases can obtain by threatening to inflict the cost of litigation on their
opponents.3 A claimant will hesitate before pursuing either a long-
shot case, where a low or fluke chance of prevailing is made attractive
by a high potential payoff, or an imposition-based case, whose settle-
ment value arises from its threat of cost infliction, if he knows he will
be responsible for the defendant's reasonable legal costs.4
* Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute. BA, Yale University. Mr. Olson is author of
THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1991), and testified before Congress in favor of the loser-pays
rule in February 1995.
** Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law. BA, Brandeis Uni-
versity; J.D., Yale University.
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1. The loser-pays rule is often referred to as the "English Rule," because it has long
been the practice in the English common-law system. The contrary practice, in which each
side is left to bear its own legal fees, is commonly termed the "American Rule." See Werner
Pfennigstorf, The European Expeyience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
37, 44 (1984) (reviewing the fee-shifting systems employed in eight European countries);
John Lenbsdorf, Toward a Histoiy of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984); Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Con-
tingency Fees: Their Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MicH. L. REv. 2154, 2154 n.2 (1992).
2. See Pfennigstorf, supra note 1, at 37 (indicating that with regard to fee-shifting,
America "on an international level ... represents the exception rather than the rule").
3. Speculative litigation can be defined as the pressing of claims that depend for their
success not on intrinsic legal merit, but on fortuity. For example, in some toxic tort and
product liability cases, the plaintiff's causation theory has been directly contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the scientific evidence. These cases may nonetheless carry poten-
tially high settlement value and be rational to file if plaintiffs' attorneys can persuade the
occasional jury to issue a verdict contrary to the scientific evidence.
4. Recent law review literature supportive of the loser-pays principle includes Gregory
E. Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney's Fees: Expanding the 'Loser-Pays' Rule in
Texas, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 1915 (1994); Lorraine W. Feinstein, Comment, Two-Way Fee Shifing
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The loser-pays rule also deters parties likely to lose on the merits
from engaging in excessive discovery and filing unnecessary motions.
Except for the remote threat ofjudicial sanctions,5 the American legal
system does little to discourage such activity. Under the loser-pays
rule, however, the losing side may ultimately have to pay for the time
the other side's attorneys wasted in responding to excessive demands.
Moreover, if the loser-pays rule applies notjust to the ultimate success
or failure of a claim as a whole, but to each individual cause of action,
motion, or other legal initiative to which an opponent is obligated to
respond, it will discourage speculative or impositional tactics even by
the side destined to prevail. Both effects will streamline litigation by
encouraging parties to focus on their strongest claims, theories, and
procedural options, rather than, as tends to be the current practice,
throwing everything but the kitchen sink at each other.
In addition, a loser-pays system is, in the authors' view, ethically
superior to the current system. A defendant who has been dragged
into litigation and had his property put in jeopardy deserves compen-
sation for having had to repulse an invalid claim. Conversely, a plain-
tiff with a valid claim deserves a measure of damages that includes
some recognition of the legal fees paid in defeating a recalcitrant
defendant.
If courts are too ready to award generous fees, they run the risk of
giving litigants with strong cases an inappropriate "cost-plus" incentive
to run up high legal bills in the expectation that the other side will be
forced to reimburse them. Such overinvestment in fees may also help
push the opponent into a disadvantageous settlement by magnifying
its fear of a fee shift. Virtually all fee-shifting systems, therefore, pro-
vide for judicial review of the extent to which claimed fees and ex-
penses are reasonable and necessary. (Courts in this country
currently carry on such review in some important categories of litiga-
tion, as in class actions and cases arising under "one-way" fee-shifting
statutes.' As an added safeguard, most countries follow a policy of
on Summary Judgment or Dismissal: An Equitable Deterrent to Unmeritorious Lawsuits, 23 PEPP. L.
REv. 125 (1996); Smith, supra note 1.
5. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (allowing federal courts to impose "an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including
a reasonable attorney's fee"); see also infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing
FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
6. See FED. R Cv. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval of class action settlements);
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE
L.J. 651, 669 (1982) (discussing the effects of judicial discretion in determining the
amount of attorney's fees to shift).
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shifting less than the full monetary cost of litigation.7 Because parties
must bear a significant share of the marginal costs of litigation even if
they win, they are shielded from the temptation to over-litigate a win-
ning case for strategic or fee-seeking reasons.
A loser-pays rule is likely to discourage another abuse of litiga-
tion, namely the use of purposeful delay by defendants aware of their
probable liability. Under a loser-pays system, if the defendant ulti-
mately loses, it must bear not only all its own legal costs, but also a
hefty chunk of any extra legal burdens that the plaintiff incurred
through its delay. By making defendants financially responsible for
the legal costs associated with resisting a legitimate claim, the loser-
pays rule also helps make legitimate but small claims economically via-
ble for plaintiffs.
After years of neglect, the loser-pays idea has recently begun to
receive considerable attention in this country. In this Article, we sur-
vey recent developments regarding the loser-pays rule in the United
States. In part I, we discuss the remarkable attempt by congressional
Republicans to enact a loser-pays rule for certain categories of litiga-
tion in federal courts. Next, we discuss the recent enactment of lim-
ited but distinctive loser-pays rules in Oklahoma and Oregon. In part
III, we review recent changes to the loser-pays rule in Alaska, the only
American jurisdiction with a long-standing, generally applicable, two-
way fee-shifting system. Finally, we conclude with some thoughts on
the future of loser-pays in the United States.
I. CONGRESSIONAL ACTVITY
In early 1995 the U.S. House of Representatives brought to the
floor a proposal for loser-pays reform in many federal court actions.'
The proposal would have required the losing side in litigation to com-
pensate the prevailing side for some of the legal costs of going to
court.9 After a vigorous debate and despite strenuous opposition
from organized lawyer groups, congressional Democrats, and the Clin-
7. See WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 330, 334-35 (1991); Lawrence W.
Newman & Michael Burrows, International Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1992, at 3 (discuss-
ing fees in England and Germany); Pfennigstorf, supra note 1, at 55-59.
8. H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
9. The main provisions of the Attorney Accountability Act, H.R. 988, included: (1)
enacting a modified loser-pays rule under which the loser pays his opponent's legal fees if
the loser rejected a settlement offer higher than the damages actually awarded; (2) amend-
ing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to require imposition of sanctions once a violation
is found; and (3) amending Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to presume opinion testimony
by scientific experts inadmissible unless proven valid and reliable. Key Provisions of the
House's Legal Reform Bills, INSIDE LIiG., Apr. 1995, at 9.
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ton Administration, the measure passed the House by a vote of 232 to
193.10 The vote was largely along party lines. Sixteen Democrats
broke ranks to support the bill, while eleven Republicans crossed the
other way to oppose it.i"
Loser-pays, together with a range of other litigation reforms,
made up one of the ten planks of the Republican "Contract with
America." 12 Before it surfaced as part of the G.O.P. Contract, national
lawmakers had paid little attention to the idea. No congressional
hearings had been held on the idea within living memory. The litera-
ture on the subject, in this country at least, had been largely theoreti-
cal." Some authors pondered the potential effects of fee-shifting
rules as a theoretical puzzle, but they were unable to reach agreement
on even such basic issues as whether the rules would be likely to affect
the rate or speed of dispute settlement.14
On a general level, of course, many lawmakers and legal profes-
sionals were aware that fee-shifting or the lack thereof stood as one of
the great differences between America's legal system and the systems
prevailing in other advanced countries.15 In fact, America stands vir-
tually alone among nations in refusing to shift fees in lawsuits, and we
fall short of presenting a united front: Alaska has long followed a
loser-pays rule.'6 Some commentators have suggested that other
countries continue to shift costs as the result of accidents in their his-
torical development,1 7 and that once these countries come to see the
superiority of the American way of litigation, they will begin to adjust
10. 141 CONG. R c. H2749 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (Roll Call Vote No. 207).
11. Id.; Nancy E. Roman, First Legal Reforms Clear House: "Loser Pays" Bill OK'd 232-193,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al.
12. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Jan. 4, 1995) (representing the broad
litigation reforms from the Contract with America). The other nine planks of the Contract
with America were: (1) Balanced-Budget Amendment and Line-Item Veto; (2) Anti-Crime
Measures; (3) Welfare Reform; (4) Family Tax Relief; (5) Middle-Class Tax Cut; (6) Na-
tional Security; (7) Social Security Earnings Tax; (8) Reductions in Capital Gains and Un-
funded Mandates; and (9) Term Limits. Contract Score Card, 53 CONG. Q. 181 (Jan. 14,
1995).
13. See John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't
Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 Hxv. L. Rrv. 1093, 1094 (1991) (citing "im-
mense literature" on theoretical question of impact of American and English Rules on
settlement rates, with list of articles).
14. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Ad-
ministration, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 437-41 (1973) (discussing the impact of the English Rule
on dispute resolution).
15. See Pfennigstorf, supra note 1, at 37.
16. See infra part IV (discussing the history of fee-shifting in Alaska pursuant to Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 82).
17. SeeJohn F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567, 1570-78 (1993).
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their rules in our direction.18 Meanwhile, critics in some English-
speaking countries have urged adoption of an American Rule on
costs.1 9 Alaska also has its critics of fee-shifting.
2 0
The logic of allowing prevailing parties a remedy for the inflic-
tion of costs on them periodically asserts itself in this country. In at
least two episodes within recent memory, evolutionary developments
that had posed a danger, if danger it was, of bringing loser-pays to the
American legal system were nipped in the bud. The first came in the
1960s and 1970s when Congress and state lawmakers began enacting a
variety of civil rights, environmental, and other public interest statutes
with provisions authorizing judges to award attorney's fees to a prevail-
ing party.2 Read literally, the language of many of these statutes
would appear to authorize something akin to European-style fee-shift-
ing. Two decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, however, gave the stat-
utes a more creative reading.2 Despite the language suggesting
judicial discretion, plaintiffs were understood to be nearly always enti-
18. See, e.g., Francis J. Carney, "Loser Pays"--Justie for the Poorest and the Richest, Others
Need Not Apply, UTAH B.J., May 1995, at 18 (arguing that the middle class in Britain, lacking
the benefit of governmental legal aid for the poor, can neither afford lawyers nor risk costs
of a loss).
19. See Bring the Balance Back, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 1995, at 13; Tim Cornwell, Quayle
Likes the "English Rule" But Brits Have Their Doubts, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 10, 1992, at 1 (noting
that steadily growing costs of government legal aid are encouraging British authorities to
consider alternatives to the English Rule, including a version of the contingent-fee system
practiced in America).
20. Kevin M. Kordziel, Note, Rule 82 Revisited: Attorney Fee Shifting in Alaska, 10 ALASKA
L. REv. 429, 431 (1993) (observing that a sizeable contingent of the Alaska bar recom-
mended entirely eliminating fee-shifting to the Alaska Supreme Court in 1993); Liz Rus-
kin, "Loser-Pays" No Cure-All in Alaska's Civil Courts, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 19, 1996,
at IA (citing a recent study by Alaska Judicial Council that Alaskans are no less inclined,
under its loser-pays system, to sue in court than are residents of other sparsely populated
states).
21. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1988) ("In any
action [for discrimination in public accommodations] the court, in its discretion, may al-
low the prevailing party... reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs .... ."); Civil Rights
Act of 1964 § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988) ("In any action [for denial of equal
employment opportunities] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party.. . a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . ."); Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C
§ 1365(d) (1988) ("The court, in issuing a final order in any action [for violation of the
Clean Water Act], may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court deter-
mines such award is appropriate."); Clean Air Act § 307(0, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(0 (1988)
(allowing the court to award costs including reasonable attorney's fees).
22. Christiansburg Garment v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412,
422-24 (1978) (holding that an award of attorney's fees against the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission pursuant to Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(k) was not justified);
Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (reviewing award of attorney's fees
under Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 204(b)).
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tled to a full fee-shift if they won, but defendants virtually were never
entitled to collect fees when they won.2" The result was the emergence
of the "one-way" fee-shift that soon became a familiar element of the
legal landscape. 4
The rise and fall of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 likewise
showed the resourcefulness of the American bar in heading off the
implementation of any general principle providing for compensation
of persons injured by legal action. In 1983 rulemakers strengthened
Rule 11 to provide, for the first time, a strong remedy for persons
victimized by groundless actions. Under Rule 11, parties can petition
the court for sanctions against the offending lawyer, client, or both.25
Courts soon developed a powerful interpretation of the new Rule: the
normal measure by which sanctions would be calculated would be the
reasonable expenditure of the victim in responding to the wrongful
motion or filing.2" Many courts explicitly added that the objective of
sanctions was to compensate those hurt by unfounded litigation, as
well as to deter misconduct.27 But the idea of shifting lawyers' fees as
a way of compensating people for the injury done by litigation, even
23. See Christiansburg Gannent, 434 U.S. at 421 (holding that a district court in its discre-
tion may award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant only upon a finding that plaintiffs
action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation"); Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402
(finding that § 204(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was included to ensure that plaintiffs
who succeed in obtaining injunctions for discrimination in public accommodation recover
attorneys' fees).
24. For a defense of one-way practice, see Rowe, supra note 6, at 662-63 (discussing the
advantages of pro-plaintiff fee-shifting in encouraging plaintiffs to act as "private attorneys
general"). See also Mark S. Stein, Is One-Way Fee Shifting Fairer than Two-Way Fee Shifting?, 141
F.R.D. 351 (1992) (observing that former Vice President Dan Quayle's Agenda for Civil
Justice Reform in America opposed federal statutes that mandate one-way, pro-plaintiff fee-
shifting).
25. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, as amended April 28, 1983, provides in perti-
nent part:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it,
a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
FED. R. Cn,. P. 11 (1983) (emphasis added); see also Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced
Approach to "Frivolous" Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provi-
sions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1077-90 (1994) (discussing 1983 amendments to Rule 11).
26. See CHARLES A. WRIGHr & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1336, at 113 (2d ed. 1990) ("Rule 11 itself gives courts the discretion to fashion sanctions
to fit specific cases; not surprisingly, attorneys' fees have become the Rule 11 sanction of
choice." (citations omitted)).
27. See id. at 100-01 ("There has been considerable discussion of three different justifi-
cations-punishment, compensation, and deterrence-for the imposition of sanctions.
Although the Advisory Committee Note mentions only deterrence, courts and commenta-
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in the relatively small proportion of cases subject to Rule 11,28 unmis-
takably suggested a flirtation with European principles of cost indem-
nity. In 1993 opponents quietly pushed through an amendment that
gutted many of Rule I l's provisions." One change apparently was
intended to de-couple the calculation of sanctions from the cost of
response. The new provision encouraged courts to set sanctions at
some presumably lower level that, nevertheless, would capture the at-
tention of the errant lawyer or client."0
Given the success of opponents in resisting loser-pays principles
in the civil rights laws and Rule 11, the newly introduced Attorney
Accountability Act"1 could be expected to face an uphill fight. De-
spite the commitment of the House majority to the Contract, it was
widely agreed that loser-pays legislation faced far less encouraging
prospects in the Senate.3 2 Moreover, if it got past that house, Presi-
dent Bill Clinton, whose administration had opposed the loser-pays
idea, was expected to veto the legislation. 3 It is easy to forget that
tors have noted that compensatory and punitive purposes also are served by sanctions
under Rule 11." (citations omitted)).
28. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 applies only to civil actions in the United States
District Courts. It is not applicable to federal criminal cases or to state cases whether civil
or criminal. While many states have closely followed the federal rules in providing Rule 11-
style remedies, others diverge to one extent or other, providing either fuller or less full
relief to victimized opponents. John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State
Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367, 1427 (1986).
29. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 was amended for technical reasons in 1987, but
no substantive change was intended. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1987).
30. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, as amended April 22, 1993, and effective De-
cember 1, 1993, provides in pertinent part:
(c) (1) (2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of
this rule shall be limited to what is suffcient to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in sub-
paragraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a
nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on mo-
tion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the
movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys'fees and other expenses incurred as a
direct result of the violation.
FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (emphasis added); see also Keeling, supra note 25, at 1090-95 (discussing
1993 amendments to Rule 11).
31. H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
32. Senator Larry Pressler, a Republican from South Dakota and chairman of the Sen-
ate Commerce Committee, indicated shortly after passage in the House of Representatives
that the loser-pays legislation did not "stand a chance" of passing the Senate. David Masci,
Broad Changes Pass House, Face Harder Sell in Senate: Three-Part Legislation Would Curb Medical
Malpractice, Suits ly Disgruntled Investors and "Frivolous Suits", 53 CONG. Q. 744, 744 (Mar. 11,
1995).
33. Attorney General Janet Reno and White House Counsel AbnerJ. Mikva sent a let-
ter on March 6, 1995, to House Speaker Newt Gingrich expressing the opposition of the
Clinton Administration to the loser-pays rules in the House legislation. The letter charac-
terized the loser-pays rules as "tilt[ing] the legal playing field dramatically to the disadvan-
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passing the House of Representatives, as the Attorney Accountability
Act did with loser-pays provisions intact, might count in normal times
as an extraordinary showing for a novel proposal on its first time out.
It might seem natural to expect the Senate and White House to recon-
sider their opposition at some later date, as loser-pays ideas become
better known and more fully debated.
The leadership of the American bar evidently prefers to dismiss
the sudden burst of interest in the idea as a mere frolic and detour,
soon to be forgotten as lawmakers move on to other issues. We think
otherwise. The bar is underestimating the appeal of loser-pays pro-
posals in the same way that it has consistently underestimated the ex-
tent of public discontent with modern litigation and the serious
nature of that discontent.34 No matter what the fate of loser-pays as a
single, highly visible proposal in Congress, we predict that the general
principle will manifest itself in many different reform proposals in
coming years, around the states and in Washington. While these pro-
posals may be less outwardly dramatic than the bill borne by the Con-
tract with America,35 cumulatively they will amount to a serious
challenge to the current rule.
Variations on loser-pays-and nearly every new proposal seems to
differ in detail-have become a common element of state-level reform
packages. For example, a loser-pays plan appeared as one component
of a package of three legal reform initiatives in California that eventu-
ally fell short at the polls after a hard-fought battle.3 6 In 1995 the
legislatures of both Oklahoma and Oregon passed bills that, while dif-
tage of consumers and middle-class citizens." Id. at 745 (quoting letter); see also Phillip D.
Bostwick, Civil Justice Reform Through Federal Legislation: Watching the House, the Senate, and
the President Make Sausage, CA27 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 317, 323 (Dec. 14, 1995) (indicating that the
loser-pays legislation is given "the least chance of becoming law").
34. See The Trouble with Lawyers (John Stossel, host, ABC television special,Jan. 2, 1996);
Mike McDaniel, Stossel Pleads for Sanity in Ruinous Legal System, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 2, 1996.
35. Attorney Accountability Act, H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
36. See Dan Bernstein, Wilson Endorses 3 Anti-Lawsuit Initiatives, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 6,
1996, at A3 (announcing California Governor Pete Wilson's support for a ballot initiative
requiring losers to pay the attorneys' fees of winners in class action lawsuits by shareholders
against corporations); Tom Dresslar, Tort Contortions: Politics, Parochial and Presidentia, Puts
Tort Reform on Hold for Another Year in California, CAL. LAw., May 1995, at 25 (noting that
Governor Wilson's aides insisted tort reform ranked with tax cuts and regulatory reform as
one of his top three legislative priorities in 1995); Philip Hager, Civil Liability System Faces
Uncivil War, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at A3 (reporting that Governor Wilson was studying
ways of reforming the civil liability system, including "[a]llowing defendants in some cases
to collect attorney fees from unsuccessful plaintiffs"). But see Stephanie Simon, The Proposi-
tions, LA TiMES, Mar. 28, 1997, at B1 (stating that nearly 60% of California voters rejected
a ballot initiative requiring shareholders who lose class action lawsuits against corporations
to pay the attorneys' fees of the winning corporations).
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fering substantially from each other and from the federal proposal,
represent significant experiments with loser-pays and will help ad-
vance the debate for lawmakers elsewhere.3 7 We predict that within a
few years other states will have joined them, and American fee prac-
tices will take on a less unified look: Alaska will no longer be an
asterisk.
The American civil justice system, we hear often, is the finest in
the world. It has the most elaborate guarantees of access, the greatest
willingness to spare no expense in the pursuit of rights, and the fullest
and most adequate methods in its assessment of damage awards.
Therefore, one might expect the public with each passing year to
beam with greater affection on the litigators and courts who have pro-
vided all this new access and all these new rights. Instead, it has risen
in revolt. How could it be so ungrateful?
Each wave of public discontent with our litigation regime has
taken our legal establishment by surprise. It was surprised when law-
yers became the butt of popular jokes and slid to near the bottom in
the occupational respect standings."8 It was surprised when an other-
wise less-than-popular figure, former Vice President Dan Quayle, sud-
denly gained public esteem by picking a fight with it at an American
Bar Association convention. 9 The bar leadership was surprised when
political candidates began running successfully for major office, such
as the California and Texas governorships, by making the need to
bring litigation under control a prominent campaign theme.4" It was
37. See infra part II (discussing the recent legislation in Oklahoma) and part III (dis-
cussing the recent legislation in Oregon).
38. See Stephen Budiansky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Jan. 30, 1995, at 50. A 1995 U.S. News & World Report poll of Americans found that only
35% believed lawyers play an important role in holding wrongdoers accountable; 56% be-
lieved lawyers use the system to protect the powerful and get rich; only 27% said lawyers
are very honest or mostly honest; and 69% said that lawyers are only sometimes honest or
not usually honest. Id. The story also noted that George Bushnell, a past president of the
American Bar Association, launched an expensive public relations campaign to combat
lawyer jokes and improve the "image" of lawyers. Id.
39. On August 13, 1991, then-Vice President Dan Quayle delivered a speech to the
American Bar Association followed by an impromptu debate in which he vigorously criti-
cized the legal profession and called for the enactment of reforms, including a loser-pays
proposal. David Broder et al., ABA President Disputes Quayle on Litigation Proposals, WASH.
POST, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al; see also Saundra Torry et al., Bush, Quayle Put Lauyers in Election-
Year Docket, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1992, at A16 (discussing how Quayle's speech before the
American Bar Association "struck a chord" with the public).
40. In November 1994 Republican Pete Wilson defeated Democrat Kathleen Brown to
win a second term as governor of California on a platform that emphasized legal reform.
See Cathleen Decker, California Elections, LA TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at A3. Ukewise, Repub-
lican George W. Bush, Jr., defeated incumbent Democratic Governor Ann Richards in
Texas due in part to his plea to "end the frivolous and junk lawsuits." Alan Bernstein, Bush
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surprised when the Republicans included litigation reform in their
Contract with America,4 1 surprised when the G.O.P. proceeded to
capture the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years,42
and then surprised when the House in its first hundred days passed all
ten planks of the Contract with America, including legal reform.4"
The House Republicans knew these proposals posed a threat to every-
thing the bar held dear." Didn't the public embrace the same values?
Helping to set up the bar leadership for this series of surprises
was its attitude toward what was often called tort reform. It viewed
tort reform as a preoccupation of business interests and doctors, per-
haps reinforced by the nostalgia of ideological conservatives for an
earlier and simpler era.4 5 The bar believed that only through inten-
sive lobbying, and not because any real mass constituency cared, these
interest groups now and again succeeded in enacting a damages cap,
or a reform ofjoint and several liability. 4 Although the organized bar
generally resisted such measures, they were at most incremental
changes that posed little threat to litigation practice. These isolated
reforms affected relatively few cases and often were confined to nar-
row practice areas such as product liability.47
Loser-pays broke from the familiar tort reform pattern. To begin
with, it threatened or promised far more fundamental changes to liti-
gation practice. If applied, it would affect virtually every case. It
would have a powerful impact, shaping incentives on whether to pro-
ceed with a claim or defense, how best to prosecute it, and when and
how to settle. Additionally, it would not remain confined to personal
Says Tort Reform Would Be Key Project If Elected Governor, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 21, 1994, at A37;
see also R.G. Ratcliffe, Richards Criticized on Tort Reform, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 14, 1994, at A13
(reporting that George W. Bush, Jr., had criticized Governor Ann Richards for accepting
more than $2.7 million in political contributions from personal injury lawyers between
1990 and 1994).
41. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
42. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1996,
at xxiv (1995) (noting that the Democrats last lost control of the House of Representatives
in 1954).
43. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
44. The ABA consistently has opposed loser-pays. See, e.g, ABA Says No to Litigation "Re-
forms" in Republican Contract with America, 63 U.S.L.W. 2506, 2507 (Feb. 21, 1995).
45. See Masci, supra note 32, at 744 (indicating that the battle over tort reform in the
House pitted businesses, doctors, consumer product makers, insurance companies, and
accounting firms against trial lawyers and consumer groups); cf. T.R. Goldman, Opponents
of Reform, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at S34 (cataloguing the various groups opposed to
tort reform).
46. SeeVargo, supra note 17, at 1618 (characterizing critics of contingency fee system as
"the 'repeat players' and their supporters").
47. See Mark A. Hofmann, States Take Center Stage, Bus. INs., June 5, 1995, at 1, (discuss-
ing the progress of tort reform in state legislatures across the country).
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injury cases; if it made sense there, it would also presumably make
sense for most other civil actions.
At the same time, unlike conventional tort reform measures,
loser-pays drew little enthusiasm from organized business, which saw it
as a drastic step with unpredictable and perhaps disruptive conse-
quences.48 The practical effect of most tort reform had been pro-de-
fendant,49 but loser-pays would unleash a wide range of effects, some
of which would redound to the benefit of plaintiffs suing business de-
fendants." Washington tort reform lobbyists kept their distance from
the loser-pays idea, and, in fact, signaled that they hoped the Republi-
cans would drop it lest it endanger the narrower product liability re-
forms they sought for their clients.51
Other political fracture lines on the issue likewise confounded
conventional expectations. The idea had been backed over the years
most prominently by a group of writers and intellectuals who were by
most standards neither conservative nor pro-business: the "neoliber-
als." They included Washington Monthly Editor in Chief Charles Pe-
ters,52 commentator Michael Kinsley,5" and commentator James
48. See, e.g., Dave Lenckus, "Loser Pays" Proposals Make Strange Bedfellows, Bus. INS., Feb.
20, 1995, at 41 (indicating that many insurance and business groups that support tort re-
form generally had concerns about the loser-pays legislation because it did not contain
uniform rules for federal and state courts and they feared it would lead to forum shop-
ping); Reynolds Holding, House Legal Reformers Find Surprise Foes-Republicans, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 13, 1995, at A4 (quoting an unidentified business lobbyist who stated that loser-pays
proposals "raise a lot of problems from everybody's side" and that "no one is enthusiastic
about it").
49. See Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731, 772-95 (1992) (arguing that the tort reform move-
ment, through, inter alia, legislative successes and shifts in public opinion, contributed to a
reduction in the success rate of plaintiffs).
50. See supra Ir-rRoDucrIoN (noting that loser-pays is likely to improve prospects for
strong small claims and discourage delay and cost-infliction by defendants).
51. See, e.g., Lenckus, supra note 48, at 41 (indicating that neither the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers nor the American Tort Reform Association was taking a stance on
loser-pays and instead were focusing their efforts on other tort reform proposals); Charles
Oliver, A Way to Trim Litigation Costs?, IrJvEsrTOR's Bus. DAiLyJune 9, 1995, at Al (quoting a
spokesperson for the American Tort Reform Association as stating that "[o]ur membership
is split on the issue" of loser-pays); Civil Liability, House Subcommittee Hears Testimony on Tort
and Civil Justice Reforms, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) A25 (Feb. 7, 1995) (reporting on
Walter Olson's testimony that loser-pays "has not met with enthusiasm from organized
business"); Product Liability, MGMr. BRIEFING (BNA) (Nov. 16, 1994) (indicating that loser-
pays "deeply divides business groups").
52. In an article on ways to improve America, Charles Peters's first proposal is adoption
of loser-pays rules. Charles Peters, No Dollars, Common Sense: Eighteen Cost-Free Steps to a
Better America, WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 1992, at 38 ("[E]xtortion suits would be quashed be-
cause plaintiffs with lousy cases would be penalized with the opposition's costs-as they are
now not-for bringing groundless cases to court. This would mean less work for lawyers
and fewer of them.").
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Fallows. 54 Another influential supporter not suspected of conservative
leanings was American Lawyer Editor and Court TVChief Steven Brill. 5
Writers and intellectuals were not the only ones to see merit in
the idea. For a novel proposal being attacked regularly in the press as
terrifying and unworkable, loser-pays ran remarkably well in an early
1995 U.S. News and World Report survey.56 To be sure, public support
varied amusingly depending on how the question was couched. When
phrased in the more menacing form-"If you sue someone and lose
the case, should you pay his costs?"-forty-four percent of those
polled agreed that they should." That is a far cry from a shabby quan-
tum of public support. Meanwhile, with sides reversed-"If someone
sues you and you win the case, should he pay your legal costs?"-
nearly everyone saw the idea as simple fairness. Eighty-five percent
answered yes.51 Presumably a number somewhere between forty-four
and eighty-five would probably reflect where the public would come
out on loser-pays if forced to take a consistent view. Consequently, it
becomes less surprising that the House Republicans stood their
ground rather than withdrawing the loser-pays measure under polit-
ical fire.59
53. In a discussion of former Vice President Dan Quayle's efforts to curb the "litigation
explosion," Michael Kinsley stated that adoption of a loser-pays proposal would not only
"curb lawsuits that are frivolous or extortionate .... It would actually encourage lawsuits
that are clearly meritorious." Michael Kinsley, Quayle's Case, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1991,
at 4.
54. Writing in the not-exactly-Gingrichite New York Review of Books, James Fallows called
the loser-pays idea "overdue." James Fallows, The Republican Promise, N.Y. Rav. Booxs, Jan.
12, 1995, at 3,4.
55. In a widely noted op-ed piece in the Washington Pos4 Steven Brill outlined five ele-
ments of a loser-pays proposal that he termed "simple, and overdue":
(1) Put the risk of the cost of litigation on whoever loses the case....
(2) Require the judge to pass on the reasonableness of the legal bills submit-
ted by the winning side ....
(3) Make the lawyers equally responsible with their clients for paying these
losers' fees ....
(4) To prevent defendants from using stonewall litigation tactics against
plaintiffs who use contingent-fee lawyers, a winning plaintiff liwyer would have his
or her choice of recovering either this one-third contingent fee or the market
fees paid by the defendant to the defense lawyer, whichever is higher.
(5) To cover the other costs of a suit, the judge would set a fee that the
plaintiff and the defendant could "charge" for the time they have to spend on the
case ....
Steven Brill, PaulaJones: There Ought to Be a Law, WAsH. PosT, June 5, 1994, at C7.
56. Budiansky et al., supra note 38, at 50 (reviewing results of a public opinion poll
questioning the behavior of lawyers, citizens, and the judicial system).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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The strong poll showings came as no surprise to Republican strat-
egists. Drafters had carefully vetted the Contract with America before
it was launched to include only proposals that they knew roused en-
thusiasm on Main Street, and loser-pays was no exception.61 "Time
and again, the audience would ask about making the losing side pay,"
said Representative David McIntosh, who won a seat for the G.O.P. in
Muncie, Indiana, in the 1994 election. "That was the reform that re-
ally resonated."61
The resulting loser-pays legislation, hastily drafted in the early
days of the new Republican House, included a few downright peculiar
terms.6" Notably, the legislation applied the loser-pays principle only
to cases filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction.6 The
choice of diversity, but not federal question actions, 64 inverted what
one might expect to be the usual priority of introduction for a proce-
dural reform. If Congress believed strongly in the case for a new pro-
cedure, one would expect it to show that confidence by applying it to
actions arising under its own statutes and only later consider applying
it to federal court actions arising under state law. Not only principles
of federal-state amity but also concern over forum-shopping might
counsel caution in proceeding with the latter step. Every new diver-
gence between federal and state procedure raises the presumably un-
welcome prospect that litigants will acquire a new tactical reason to
make sure cases land in the one court system instead of the other.6"
60. See, e.g.,Jonathan Alter et al., Bracing for the Big One, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 1994, at 27
(stating that every clause of the Contract with America "was included only after it had been
approved by at least 60 percent of the voters in public-opinion surveys");JulieJohnson, In
the Eyes of Newt, TIME, Oct. 10, 1994, at 35 (reporting that in developing the Contract with
America Republican strategists held focus groups every 10 days starting in January 1994).
61. Walter Olson, And Now for Tort Refom, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 16, 1994.
62. The loser-pays proposal was included initially as part of a broader package of legal
reforms entitled the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 101 (as introduced, Jan. 4, 1995). Later, the loser-pays proposal was introduced
with minor changes as a separate bill entitled the Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R.
988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (as introduced, Feb. 16, 1995).
63. The loser-pays provision was drafted as an amendment to § 1332 of title 28 of the
U.S. Code. H.R. 10; H.R. 988. Section 1332 grants diversity jurisdiction to federal courts
over what would otherwise be state law claims if the parties are citizens of different states.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) ("The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions where the matter... is between-(1) citizens of different States; . . ").
64. Federal question jurisdiction is provided for by § 1331 of title 28 of the U.S. Code.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). Because
the loser-pays provision was drafted as an amendment to § 1332, it does not affect cases
filed based on federal question jurisdiction. See H.R. 10; H.R. 988.
65. Forum-shopping, which is the practice of litigants seeking a tactical advantage by
having their case heard in a particular court, has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Pennzoil
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Plaintiffs can often control which forum will hear their case by a
shrewd choice of defendants.
Another provision in the House loser-pays bill would have given
plaintiffs the maximum benefit of forum-shopping. Specifically, the
bill would have applied loser-pays only to cases filed in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction and not to cases initially filed in state court
but subsequently removed to federal court on the defendants' peti-
tion.66 Thus, even if a case were destined to be heard as a diversity
action in federal court, a plaintiff could escape the loser-pays rule by
filing in state court and forcing the defendant to remove. Or, if the
plaintiff felt the fee-shifting provision was advantageous given the de-
tails of the case, he could secure the loser-pays rule by initially filing
the case in federal court.
Over a wide range of cases, the legislation as originally drafted
would have introduced loser-pays at the plaintiffs option. This ex-
traordinary result turned out to be too clever. If drafters of the Con-
tract with America bill imagined that they could somehow soften
opposition by introducing the loser-pays idea in a way so favorable to
plaintiffs, they were proved shortsighted. Very little of the public op-
position to the bill treated this feature as a welcome mitigation or sav-
ing grace; few opponents even mentioned it at all. Meanwhile, some
evidence suggests that the gambit did drive away potential support
among defense interests.67 Given its utter failure,68 one may predict
that this stratagem will not be repeated in future drafting of loser-pays
legislation.
Between committee hearings and final floor consideration, the
House bill was amended from "full" to "modified" loser-pays.69 In the
Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 24 (1987) (Marshall,J., concurring) (referring to "the odor
of impermissible forum shopping which pervades this case"); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (attempting to reduce the incentive to parties to choose a federal as
opposed to a state forum by applying state substantive law in federal diversity cases); Skelly
Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317, 333
(1967) (decrying forum-shopping as having become "a national legal pastime"); OLSON,
supra note 7, at 84-86, 190-91.
66. Federal courts have the power to remove cases from state courts. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441-1452 (1988). Because the loser-pays provision was drafted as an amendment to
section 1332, it does not affect cases removed from state court by defendants. See H.R. 10;
H.R. 988.
67. See Lenckus, supra note 48, at 41 (reporting that insurers and the American Bar
Association expressed concern about the potential for forum shopping in the loser-pays
legislation as introduced in the House).
68. See Masci, supra note 32, at 744 (commenting that the loser-pays legislation that
passed the House of Representatives did not "stand a chance" of passage in the Senate).
69. Compare H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (as introduced, Feb. 16, 1995) with
H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (as reported in the House, Mar. 2, 1995).
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modified form, the legislation applied only to actions in which a plain-
tiff spurned a defendant's formal offer of settlement and shifted only
costs incurred after the failed settlement offer.7 ° In addition, both the
original and the modified bill limited the magnitude of a fee-shift to
the amount reasonably payable to a party's own lawyer.7' Without
pausing to analyze either provision at length, we would simply com-
ment that neither provision is necessarily inconsistent with achieving
reasonably robust loser-pays incentives across a wide range of cases.
The last-minute revisions did not change the eccentric choice of do-
main provisions of the bill, however, which applied to cases filed under
diversity jurisdiction but not to cases removed from state to federal
court.
72
II. OKLAHOMA
In May 1995, two months after the U.S. House of Representatives
passed its bill, 73 Oklahoma lawmakers enacted a loser-pays proposal
applying to larger personal injury cases, as part of a package of tort
reforms.74 Under the legislation, a defendant can choose whether to
70. Section 2 of House Bill 988 provided in pertinent part:
(5) If all offers made by a party under paragraph (1) with respect to a claim or
claims including any motion to dismiss all claims are not accepted and the judg-
ment, verdict, or order finally issued (exclusive of costs, expenses, and attorney's
fees incurred afterjudgment or trial) in the action under this section is not more
favorable to the offeree with respect to the claim or claims than the last such
offer, the offeror may file with the court, within 10 days after the final judgment,
verdict, or order is issued, a petition for payment of costs and expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred with respect to the claim or claims from the date the last
such offer was made or, if the offeree made an offer under this subsection, from the
date the last such offer by the offeree was made.
H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (as placed on the Senate calendar, Mar. 16, 1995)
(emphasis added).
71. Section 2 of House Bill 988 provided in pertinent part:
(7) Attorney's fees under paragraph (6) shall be a reasonable attorney'sfeeattributa-
ble to the claim or claims involved, calculated on the basis of an hourly rate which
may not exceed that which the court considers acceptable in the community in which the
attorney practices law, taking into account the attorney's qualifications and experi-
ence and the complexity of the case, except that the attorney's fees under para-
graph (6) may not exceed-
(A) the actual cost incurred by the offeree for an attorney's fee payable to an
attorney for services in connection with the claim or claims ....
H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995) (emphasis added).
72. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
74. S.B. 263, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Okla. Sess. Law (enacted).
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invoke the provision by making an offer of judgment.75 If he does,
the plaintiff who turns down the offer and is awarded less at trial can
be liable for attorney's fees incurred by the defendant after the of-
fer.76 Once a defendant makes an offer, the plaintiff is free to make a
"counteroffer of judgment,"77 which starts the loser-pays meter run-
ning in his favor if the defendant turns it down and is required to pay
more at trial. 78 The bill is confined to personal injury cases in which
either a plaintiff demands more than $100,000 or a defendant offers
more than $100,000. 71
The Oklahoma loser-pays plan resulted from an exhaustively ne-
gotiated compromise between tort reformers and their opponents.
The reformers, organized under the name Citizens Against Lawsuit
Abuse (CALSA),80 had assembled a war chest of more than $2 million
to push for reform in the state legislature and, if necessary, through
ballot initiatives."1 Facing the most serious challenge in its history, the
75. Section 1 provides that "any defendant may file with the court, at any time more
than ten (10) days prior to trial, an offer ofjudgment for a sum certain to any plaintiff with
respect to the action or any claim or claims asserted in the action ... " Id. § 1.
76. Section 1 also provides:
3. In the event the plaintiff rejects the offer(s) ofjudgment and the judgment
awarded the plaintiff, exclusive of any costs or attorneys fees otherwise recover-
able, is less than the final offer ofjudgment, then the defendant filing the offer of
judgment shall be entitled to recover reasonable litigation costs and reasonable
attorneys fees incurred by that defendant from the date of filing of the final offer
of judgment until the date of the verdict....
Id.
77. With regard to defendants, section 1 provides in pertinent part: "In the event a
defendant files an offer ofjudgment, the plaintiff may, within ten (10) days, file with the
court a counteroffer of judgment directed to each defendant who has filed an offer of
judgment." Id.
78. Section 1 also provides:
In the event a defendant rejects counteroffer(s) ofjudgment and the judgment
awarded to the plaintiff is greater than the final counteroffer of judgment, the
plaintiff shall be entitled to recover reasonable litigation costs and reasonable
attorneys fees incurred by the plaintiff from the date of filing of the final counter-
offer ofjudgment until the date of the verdict.
Id.
79. Section 1 establishes the following limitation: "The provisions of this subsection
shall apply only where the plaintiff demands in a pleading or in trial proceedings more
than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), or where the defendant makes an
offer ofjudgment more than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00)." Id.
80. Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse (CALSA) was an alliance of independent tort re-
formers, insurance companies, and business groups. Telephone Interview with Terry West,
Lawyer, Oklahoma Trial Lawyers' Association (Dec. 1995) [hereinafter West Interview]
(stating that CALSA was basically supported by manufacturers, insurance companies, and
business groups).
81. See Chuck Ervin, Tort Law Reform Nearer Reality, TuLsA WoRLD, May 9, 1995, at NI;
see also West Interview, supra note 80 (stating that CALSA had raised $2 million to help
enact tort reform legislation).
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Oklahoma Trial Lawyers' Association (OTLA) came to the bargaining
table.8 2 According to attorney Terry West of OTLA, between January
and April negotiators for CALSA and OTLA spent about fifty hours a
week hammering out a compromise that included provisions address-
ing punitive damages reform and loser-pays.83 Part of the compro-
mise was an understanding that both sides would support the
legislation only if no amendments were made by the legislature, and
that neither side would try to pass any additional litigation reforms for
three years.8 4 In addition to CALSA and OTLA, the state Chamber of
Commerce and the chambers in the state's two largest cities,
Oklahoma City and Tulsa, signed off on the compromise.8 5
CALSA and OTLA presented their compromise as a fait accompli
to legislators, who passed it by margins of ninety-one to six in the state
House" and forty-seven to one in the state Senate.8 7 Some com-
plaints were heard from combatants on both sides of the controversy.
On the reform side, some small business advocates had hoped for
more sweeping measures going beyond the topics included in the
compromise.8 8 Meanwhile, some opponents of litigation reform ob-
jected to the legislation with particular vehemence. 9 On the whole,
however, most comments were moderate in tone. For example, the
Sunday Oklahoman in Oklahoma City called the package a "modest im-
provement" over current law and added that if it was not successful in
controlling litigation rates stronger measures would be needed later.9"
As yet we have no reports of notable early experiences under the
law. 91
82. Ervin, supra note 81, at N1.
83. West Interview, supra note 80.
84. Ervin, supra note 81, at Ni (referring to the three-year moratorium on new tort
reform legislation as a "gentlemen's agreement"); see also West Interview, supra note 80.
85. Ervin, supra note 81, at N1.
86. Chuck Ervin, House, Senate Pass Tort Refornu, TuLsA WORLD, May 24, 1995, at N9.
87. Id.
88. Oklahoma State Senator Dave Herbert said: "This isn't tort reform .... This is tort
marshmallow." Id.
89. The Tulsa World reported that State Senator Gene Stipe said that "the bill primarily
is designed to protect big corporations who kill innocent people because of wanton disre-
gard for their safety." Id. The account continued: "Stipe said the legislation would help
people like those responsible for the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building,
where 19 children died." Id. Another report in the Tulsa World characterized Senator
Stipe as "one of the state's major trial lawyers" with offices "in a half-dozen cities." Ervin,
supra note 81, at NI.
90. Editorial, A Restrained Endorsemen4 SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, May 21, 1995, at 10.
91. See West Interview, supra note 80 (stating that the legislation applies to relatively
few cases and has not had discernible effects yet).
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III. OREGON
In contrast to the grand compromise that brought limited loser-
pays to Oklahoma,92 Oregon saw a hard-fought battle that resulted in
quite a different experiment with the idea. After Republicans took
control of the state legislature in 1994,9" reform legislators soon intro-
duced an ambitious legal overhaul package.
In its original form, the Oregon legislation94 provided that in all
cases in which the amount claimed was less than $20,000 the losing
party would have to reimburse the prevailing party for all reasonable
attorney's fees.95 The bill as introduced further provided that a party
that successfully moved for a summary judgment resolving all of the
opponent's claims or defenses could recover attorney's fees, although
the opponent could avoid this provision by a dismissal or withdrawal
of the claim or defense within twenty-one days of the summary judg-
ment motion.96 A plaintiff who spurned an offer of judgment and
then received less at trial waived statutory or contractual entitlement
to attorney's fees, while the defendant's entitlement to attorney's fees
began from the date of the rejected offer through trial.97 Finally, in
what proved to be the provision with the most staying power, the bill
sought to convert the state's one-way fee-shifting statutes into two-way
statutes, so that the prevailing party would receive attorney's fees
whether he was a plaintiff or a defendant.98
The original proposal brought heated opposition from the Ore-
gon Trial Lawyers Association.99 Surprisingly, or perhaps not, the Or-
92. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
93. See Steve Suo & Cathy Kiyomura, Rural GOP Takes Over Capitol, OREGONIN, Nov. 11,
1994, at Cl (discussing the Republican takeover of the Oregon state legislature for the first
time since 1955).
94. S.B. 385, 68th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Or. Laws (as introduced).
95. See OREGON LrrIG. REFORM COALITION, 1995 LEcIs. REP. 6 (Sept. 18, 1995) (on file
with author) (stating that in its original form, Oregon Senate Bill 385 included a modified
loser-pays system for cases involving less than $20,000).
96. See id. (describing the provisions of the original legislation as they relate to parties
moving for summary judgment).
97. See id. at 6-7 (analyzing the penalty imposed under the legislation as originally
drafted on plaintiffs who refused to accept offers of compromise).
98. See id. (reporting that the original version of Senate Bill 385 would have converted
all one-way fee-shifting statutes to two-way statutes); cf S.B. 385, 68th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess.
§§ 18-138, 1995 Or. Laws (as enacted) (detailing the specific sections of the Oregon Re-
vised Statute that were amended from one-way to two-way fee-shifting).
99. In testimony before the Oregon legislature's Joint Subcommittees on Civil Process,
Charles S. Tauman, Executive Director, Oregon Trial Lawyers Association, explained his
organization's opposition to the loser-pays provisions of Oregon Senate Bill 385. Charles
S. Tauman, Testimony Before Oregon Joint Subcommittees on Civil Process (Feb. 21,
1995) (transcript on file with author). Tauman testified that "the 'loser pays' provisions of
SB 385 deny the average Oregonian, the middle class Oregonian, de facto access to civil
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egon Association of Defense Counsel also opposed the loser-pays
idea.100 Opponents of the legislation brought in famed attorney F.
Lee Bailey, fresh from consulting as a member of the OJ. Simpson
defense team, to instruct Oregonians on the dangers to the adminis-
tration of justice posed by loser-pays proposals.101
The bill was extensively, though not completely, cut back in com-
mittee.1 0 2 The general loser-pays provisions were rendered almost
meaningless by the use of a damages cap set at a derisory level. The
amended bill allowed a prevailing party to collect a maximum of $500
in attorney's fees,10 3 unless a party acted in bad faith or frivolously, in
which case the ceiling would rise to $5000."' Lawmakers completely
eliminated fee-shifting for summary judgments." 5
The one application of loser-pays that survived largely intact in
the final legislation-and which makes the Oregon legislation inter-
esting as a precedent elsewhere-is the conversion of a long list of
one-way loser-pays statutes into two-way statutes.10 6 Exceptions were
made for suits filed by the state itself and for discrimination suits; in
these cases defendants would obtain attorneys' fees only if there had
been no reasonable basis for the complaint.10 '
justice... [b]ecause 'loser pays' imposes an unacceptable risk on citizens of modest means
who find themselves in need of their measure ofjustice." Id. at 2. Tauman also character-
ized the loser-pays proposal as "bad law and bad policy." Id. at 9.
100. In a letter to the co-chairman of the Oregon Joint Subcommittee on Civil Process,
the Oregon Association of Defense Counsel expressed its opposition to the loser-pays pro-
posal on the grounds that it would discourage people from bringing meritorious claims.
See Ashbel S. Green, Barring the Courtroom Door, OREGONAN, Feb. 19, 1995, at BI (reporting
on the content of the letter).
101. See Jeff Manning, F. Lee Bailey on Offense Against 'Loser Pays' Bil4 OREGONIAN, Mar. 6,
1995, at B3 (reporting on Bailey's visit to Oregon at the behest of the Oregon Trial Law-
yers Association).
102. Compare S.B. 385, 68th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Or. Laws (as introduced) with S.B.
385, 68th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., 1995 Or. Laws (as enacted). See also Gregory R. Mowe &
Katherine A. McDowell, Changing the Rules: Tracking Oregon's Trail of "Tort Reform, "OR. ST.
B. BULL., Aug./Sept. 1995, at 17 ("The laws ultimately enacted represent a substantially
moderated version of the original 'tort reform' package proposed by the business lobby.").
103. The amount of the fee a prevailing plaintiff has a right to recover depends on
whether judgment is given with or without trial and whether the action is in circuit court
($500 with trial or $250 without trial), district court ($250 with trial or $125 without trial),
or the small claims department ($75 with trial or $50 without trial). S.B. 385, 68th Leg., 1st
Spec. Sess. § 7(2), 1995 Or. Laws (as enacted).
104. S.B. 385, 68th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. § 7(3), 1995 Or. Laws (as enacted).
105. Instead of allowing fee-shifting, the Oregon legislature amended the standard for
granting summaryjudgment. Compare S.B. 385, 68th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Or. Laws (as
introduced) with S.B. 385, 68th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. § 5, 1995 Or. Laws (as enacted). See
also OREGON LrTIG. REFORM CoALrrION, supra note 95, at 9 (discussing the effect of Oregon
Senate Bill 385 on the summary judgment standard).
106. S.B. 385, 68th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. §§ 18-138, 1995 Or. Laws (as enacted).
107. Id. §§ 20, 23-24, 28, 68-69, 110, 116-17.
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As applied to a long list of other statutes, spelled out one by one
in the legislation, mandatory one-way fee-shifting would become dis-
cretionary two-way fee-shifting.1 0 8 To prevent judges from ignoring
the legislative mandate, as the U.S. Supreme Court had done in Chis-
tiansburg Garment v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission"9 and
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,110 the Oregon legislature
bounded their discretion. A list of factors for them to consider in
exercising their discretion was enumerated: the objective reasonable-
ness of claims and defenses asserted by each party; the diligence
shown by the parties; the reasonableness of settlement decisions; the
extent to which shifting fees might discourage the making of good
faith claims and defenses; and the extent to which it might discourage
the making of meritless claims and defenses."' l Notably absent from
the list of factors is the relative net worth of the parties.
1 2
The Oregon Senate approved the revised version of Senate Bill
385 on May 23, 1995, by a vote of twenty to ten. 1 3 The vote was
mostly along party lines with only one Democrat breaking ranks to
vote in favor of the bill.114 The law went into effect on September 11,
1995.1 5
IV. ALASKA
Alone among American states, Alaska has had a fee-shifting rule
for decades.1 1 ' The Act of Congress that first established Alaska as a
territory in 1900 specified that a prevailing party's judgment should
include attorney's fees.1 17 The rule survived statehood and currently
108. Id. §§ 18, 21-22, 25-27, 29-48, 50-67, 70-109, 111-115, 118-138.
109. 434 U.S. 412 (1978); see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing the
case at greater length).
110. 390 U.S. 400 (1968); see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing the
case at greater length).
111. S.B. 385, 68th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. § 6, 1995 Or. Laws (as enacted).
112. See OREGON IaTIG. REF Rm CoArnON, supra note 95, at 8 (characterizing the ab-
sence of a factor allowingjudges to consider the relative net worth of parties as significant).
113. Hot Topics: Senate Approves GOP's Centerpiece of Legal Reform, OREGONtAN, May 24,
1995, at D4.
114. Id.
115. Officially, the law became effective on September 9, 1995, 90 days after the last day
of the legislative session, but because that was a Saturday, the practical effective date for
S.B. 385 was Monday, September 11, 1995. Mowe & McDowell, supra note 102, at 17 n.2.
116. The authors relied heavily on an excellent student note in preparing this section.
See Kevin M. Kordziel, Note, Rule 82 Revisited: Attorney Fee Shifting in Alaska, 10 ALAsKA L.
REv. 429 (1993).
117. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, §§ 509-28, 31 Stat. 321, 415-81.
1180 [VOL. 55:1161
LOSER-PAYS
is codified as Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82.118 The Alaska
Supreme Court modified the rule in early 1993, making it somewhat
biased in favor of plaintiffs.119 Nevertheless, it remains the strictest
two-way fee-shifting rule in the United States.
Rule 82 provides the following schedule of attorney's fees to be
awarded to a plaintiff who obtains a monetary award: 12 0
Amount of Judgment and, if
Awarded, Prejudgment
Interest
First $25,000
Next $75,000
Next $400,000
Over $500,000
Contested
Contested Without
with Trial Trial Uncontested
20% 18% 10%
10% 8% 3%
10% 6% 2%
10% 2% 1%
Under the old version of Rule 82, in effect through 1992, if a court
determined that the money judgment was not an accurate criterion
for determining the fee to be allowed to the prevailing side, then the
court had discretion to award a fee commensurate with the amount
and value of legal services rendered. 121 The court was not required to
state its reasons for deviating from the schedule or to justify the
amount of its award. 122 In any event, the vast majority of fee awards
followed the schedule.'
2 3
Also under the old Rule 82, if the defendant emerged victorious,
the court had the discretion to award him "reasonable" attorney's
fees. 124 Although the statute did not specify what constituted "reason-
able" fees, fifty percent of actual expenditures was a fairly standard
award. 12 5 Judges also had discretion to disallow any attorney's fee
award based upon the equities of the case or other valid reasons, but
those reasons were not stated in the Rule.1 26
118. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82 ("Except as otherwise provided... the prevailing party in a
civil case shall be awarded attorney's fees calculated under this rule.").
119. Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 1118 (Jan. 7, 1993) (cited in ALASKA R. Crv. P. 82 (His-
tory)). For further explanation of the rule modification, see Kordziel, supra note 116, at
433-34.
120. ALASKA R. Cn,. P. 82(b)(1).
121. Kordziel, supra note 116, at 433-34.
122. Id. at 434.
123. See ALAN J. TOMKINS & THoMAs E. WILLGING, TAXATION OF ATroRN'ys' FEES: PRAC-
TICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL COURTS 42 (1986) (estimating that Alaska trial
judges based fee awards on the schedule in over 80% of cases involving a monetary
recovery).
124. ALASA R. Crv. P. 82(a) (1) (repealed 1993); see also Kordziel, supra note 116, at 433.
125. See Kordziel, supra note 116, at 449 & n.124.
126. Id. at 434.
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Before discussing the new version of Rule 82, it is important to
recognize that Rule 82 operates in tandem with Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 68.127 Under Rule 68, if a plaintiff rejects an offer and
later obtains a recovery that is less than the amount of the offer, then
the defendant is treated as the "prevailing party."128 In such a situa-
tion, the defendant would be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees
from the date of the settlement offer.12 9 Consequently, a plaintiff
could emerge victorious at trial, yet suffer an overall monetary loss if
the award was less than the defendant's offer and the defendant's rea-
sonable attorney's fees from the time of the offer were greater than
the plaintiff's award.'
Alaska's fee-shifting rules generally had not aroused much con-
troversy"' until early 1992, when the Alaska Supreme Court decided
Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co.1 12 Bozarth sued Atlantic Richfield
Oil Co. (ARCO) for allegedly firing him in violation of Alaska's
whistleblower statute. 13  The trial court granted summary judgment
127. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 68.
128. Rule 68 provides in pertinent part:
(b) If the judgment finally rendered by the court is not more favorable to the
offeree than the offer...
(1) ... the offeree must pay the costs and attorney's fees incurred after the
making of the offer (as would be calculated under Civil Rules 79 and 82 if the
offeror were the prevailing party). The offeree may not be awarded costs or attor-
ney's fees incurred after the making of the offer.
ALASKA R. Crv. P. 68(b)(1).
129. Id.
130. A recent report by the Alaska Judicial Council suggests that few defendants ever
collect attorney's fees from plaintiffs because the plaintiffs have no money or their assets
are protected from creditors. Liz Ruskin, Lawsuits Not "Loser Pays" If the Loser Doesn't Pay,
OREGONAN, Feb. 25, 1996, at A19 (reporting that in only 4 of 21 cases studied did the
winning defendant actually collect fees). It is worth reiterating that the rarity of actual
collection of fees from losing plaintiffs does not mean the device is unhelpful in discourag-
ing weak or exaggerated claims, especially because many plaintiffs may be less than fully
confident that they will in fact be judgment-proof at the end of a possibly lengthy action,
and because in some cases defendants may have offered forbearance from fee-collection
efforts in exchange for, e.g., a plaintiff's willingness to forbear from appeal of a verdict.
131. One exception was a symposium in the Judges'Journal in 1985. Compare AndrewJ.
Kleinfeld, Alaska: Where the Loser Pays the Winner's Fees, 24 JUDGES' J. 4 (1985) (criticizing
Rule 82 for forcing litigants to settle) and Andrew J. Kleinfeld, On Shifting Attorneys'Fees in
Alaska: A Rebuttal 24JuDGES'J. 39 (1985) (arguing for the abolition of Rule 82) withJames
A. Parrish, The Alaska Rules Are a Success: Plaintiff's View, 24JUDGES' J. 8 (1985) (defending
Rule 82) and H. Bixler Whiting, The Alaska Rules Are a Success: Defendant's View, 24 JUDGES'
J. 9 (1985) (same). For an earlier examination of Rule 82, see GregoryJ. Hughes, Com-
ment, Award of Attorney's Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82, 4 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REV. 129,
139-45 (1974) (relating that the Alaska Bar Association unsuccessfully called for the repeal
of Rule 82 in 1974).
132. 833 P.2d 2 (Alaska 1992).
133. Id. at 3.
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to ARCO and awarded ARCO $76,000 in attorney's fees, half of the
company's actual expenditure.1 3 4 On appeal to the Alaska Supreme
Court, the majority upheld the award but expressed concern that Rule
82 inhibits "a broad spectrum of our populace from the voluntary use
of our courts."13 5
Soon thereafter, Chief Justice Rabinowitz of the Alaska Supreme
Court appointed a subcommittee of the state Civil Rules Standing
Committee to consider possible changes to Rule 82.136 During its de-
liberations, the Civil Rules Subcommittee surveyed the Alaska bar.13 7
Surprisingly, given the hostility of the organized bar in the rest of the
United States to any form of loser-pays rule, a majority of Alaska attor-
neys opposed rescinding or substantially amending Rule 82."'8 Even
more surprising, defense attorneys favored retaining Rule 82, albeit
not by quite as high a margin as plaintiffs' attorneys.13 9
Moreover, seventy percent of the attorneys surveyed reported that
the old Rule 82 did not deter plaintiffs of moderate means from filing
claims."4 Over two-thirds of survey respondents stated that former
Rule 82 did not put excessive settlement pressure on moderate in-
come litigants.1 41
In written comments, some attorneys argued that the old Rule 82
deterred only frivolous or nonmeritorious claims.14 2 Other attorneys
noted that Rule 82 required plaintiffs to assess their claims more real-
istically, which often resulted in the settlement of weaker claims.
14 3
134. Id.
135. Id. at 4 n.3; see also Van Huff v. SOHIO Alaska Petroleum Co., 835 P.2d 1181, 1183
(Alaska 1992) (pointing out that Rule 82 can be quite burdensome).
136. Kordziel, supra note 116, at 440.
137. Id. at 443.
138. Id. at 443, 466-67 (showing that 80% of respondents in the survey of members of
the Alaska bar opposed rescinding Rule 82, while more than 65% opposed amending it).
139. The survey of members of the Alaska bar found that 169 of 201, or 84%, of plain-
tiffs' attorneys opposed rescinding Rule 82, while 132 of 161, or 82%, of defense attorneys
opposed it. Id. at 467. Perhaps these results are not so surprising, given our earlier com-
ment about how loser-pays discourages defendants from engaging in delaying tactics. See
supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. James A. Parrish, a plaintiff's attorney in Fair-
banks, Alaska, believes that the Alaska system discourages delaying tactics because
[iut is simply impossible, even with a clear liability and clear damage case, in the
$10,000 to $20,000 range, to make a profit against an obstructive defense in the
absence of an attorney's fees rule. Even simple contract cases can be forced to
take 10 days actual trial time without regard to the amount at issue.
Daniel B. Moskowitz, Alaska Seeks to Spur Settlement of Suits with Rule on Lawyers'Fees, WASH.
POST, July 29, 1985, at F7.
140. Kordziel, supra note 116, at 443, 466-67.
141. Id. at 443-44, 466-67.
142. Id. at 443.
143. Id. at 444.
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Many attorneys also wrote that they believed that the Rule's partial
compensation of prevailing parties was just."4
Ultimately, the Civil Rules Subcommittee suggested only minor
revisions to Rule 82. The Subcommittee recommended that instead
of allowingjudges to use their discretion in determining the amount
of fee awards to victorious defendants and plaintiffs who do not win
monetary damages, judges should apply a fixed percentage of reason-
able fees incurred for the sake of consistency." The Subcommittee
also recommended that if courts deviated from the fixed fee sched-
ules, they should have tojustify it by reference to the following factors:
the complexity of the litigation, length of the trial, reasonableness of
the attorneys' hourly rates, reasonableness of the number of attorneys
used, diligence in efforts to minimize fees, willingness to reach a set-
tlement agreement, reasonableness of claims and defenses pursued by
each side, the relationship between the amount of work performed
and significance of the matters at stake, and other relevant equitable
factors.
146
Bowing to strong resistance from the Alaska bar, the Subcommit-
tee specifically rejected adding an ability-to-pay factor to Rule 82.147
The Civil Rules Committee then recommended that the Alaska
Supreme Court adopt the Subcommittee's proposed changes? 41 Yet
despite the Subcommittee's well-reasoned report, the Alaska Supreme
Court took a slightly different path. A majority of the court wanted to
address the Bozarth'49 access issue, and the justices were not going to
let the Subcommittee's recommendations stand in their way.
In January 1993 the court adopted most of the Subcommittee's
recommendations, while retaining the fee schedule for prevailing
plaintiffs with monetary awards from the old Rule 82.15 ° It also added
a provision that
[i]n cases in which the prevailing party recovers no money
judgment, the court shall award the prevailing party in a case
which goes to trial 30 percent of the prevailing party's actual
attorney's fees which were necessarily incurred, and shall
award the prevailing party in a case resolved without trial 20
144. Id. at 445.
145. Id. at 445-46 (noting that the subcommittee recommended a figure of either 30%
or 35%).
146. Id. at 446.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 132-135.
150. Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 1118 (Jan. 7, 1993) (cited in ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82
(History)).
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percent of its actual attorney's fees which were necessarily
incurred. 1
51
The Rule promulgated by the court also allowed a court, in deter-
mining whether to ignore the schedule of fees, to consider "the extent
to which a given fee award may be so onerous to the non-prevailing
party that it would deter similarly situated litigants from the voluntary
use of the courts.
1 52
Overall, the new Rule 82 is more pro-plaintiff than the old Rule
82. Under the old Rule 82, courts typically awarded victorious plain-
tiffs between forty and eighty percent of their reasonable expenses."5
Under the new Rule 82, defendants can get only a maximum of thirty
percent.1 54 Victorious plaintiffs, meanwhile, are entitled to the same
attorneys' fees as they were under the old Rule 82.155
The new Rule 82 also specifically permits judges to consider a
losing party's ability to pay in determining whether to ignore the
schedule, and what damages to award instead.' 56 Because large cor-
porations rarely sue individuals, but many individuals sue corpora-
tions, this provision has a clear antidefendant bias.
Justice Rabinowitz, who dissented from the adoption of the
amendments to Rule 82, expressed his concern that the new provi-
sions "will unnecessarily and dramatically increase litigation over attor-
ney's fees awards both in our trial courts as well as in this court. "157
According to Rabinowitz, any attorney "worth his or her salt" will re-
quest variations from either the schedule or the fixed rate.' 5
It is too soon to tell whether the changes to Rule 82 are having
any substantial effect on litigation in Alaska. Nevertheless, there is a
lesson to be learned from Alaska's experience. Alaska has had two-
way fee-shifting for almost one hundred years-yet the public, the bar,
and even plaintiffs' lawyers generally support it.1 59 The only impor-
tant opposition has come from the state's supreme court justices, and
even they have stopped at modifying the law, without gutting it. 6 It
151. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82(b)(2).
152. ALAsKA R. Cxv. P. 82(b)(3)(H).
153. Kordziel, supra note 116, at 437.
154. ALASKA R. Cirv. P. 82(b)(2).
155. The exception is that a victorious plaintiff who did not recover a money judgment
cannot receive more than 30%. Id.
156. ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82(b) (3) (1).
157. Alaska Sup. CL Order No. 1118 (Jan. 7, 1993) (Rabinowitz,J., dissenting) (cited in
ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82 (notes)).
158. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82 n.2.
159. See supra notes 138-144 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 149-156 and accompanying text.
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seems that, contrary to the warnings of plaintiffs' lawyers and some
defense attorneys in the lower forty-nine states, the end of the world
will not be upon us if more jurisdictions adopt loser-pays.
V. THE FUTURE OF LOSER-PAYS
If recent experience is any indication, legislative experiments
with loser-pays will continue to spring up around the states, sometimes
with little notice elsewhere. A key determinant of their success, of
course, will be the degree of sympathy with which judges implement
the new provisions. Unsympathetic courts have struck down many tort
reform enactments over the years, 6 ' and fee-shifting, given its reli-
ance on the judiciary for enforcement, is especially vulnerable to be-
ing undercut by a bench that does not share its objectives.
State lawmakers also can light a path forward for their federal
counterparts. Consider, for example, Oregon's step in turning one-
way fee-shifting statutes into two-way statutes.1 62 One-way fee-shifting
currently typifies wide areas of federal as well as state statutory law.163
Yet, given its complete defiance of the expectation of basic symmetry
and reciprocity in legal relations, this body of procedure should be
more controversial than it currently is. The current one-way regime
may be characterized as "heads I win and tails we're even." It provides
plaintiffs with maximum fuel for speculative litigation and maximum
leverage against defendants who may expect to win but cannot rule
out the chance of a fluke loss.
Turning one-way fee-shifting statutes into two-way statutes should
help build pressure to reform some of the more objectionable aspects
of the current fee-shifting system, most notably the methods by which
courts calculate attorney's fees. For example, judges often award full
attorney's fees to a plaintiff who prevails on a liability theory that has a
fee-shifting provision, even if much of the case and fees were spent
arguing over damages theories on which the defendant prevailed, or
161. See, e.g., Galayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 298, 301-02 (Ohio 1994) (strik-
ing down a statutory periodic payment scheme for medical malpractice cases as being viola-
tive of the state constitutional rights to ajury trial and due process); Zoppo v. Homestead
Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ohio 1994) (holding that a statute that reserved to courts
the authority to determine punitive damages violated the state constitutional right to trial
byjury); Smith v. Myers, 887 P.2d 541, 543 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that a statute requiring a
periodic payment scheme in medical malpractice suits violated the state constitution).
162. See supra notes 98, 106-112 and accompanying text.
163. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983) (noting that Congress has
departed from the American Rule in "more than 150 existing federal fee-shifting
provisions").
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liability theories arising under non-fee-shifting provisions.164 Explicit
two-way fee-shifting is likely to lead to reconsideration of such policies,
for the same reason that under European systems partial plaintiff vic-
tories at trial are commonly treated for fee-shifting purposes as only
partial victories or even as defeats.1 6
5
Two-way fee-shifting also is likely to lead to reconsideration of
"lodestar" and "bonus" theories under which prevailing plaintiffs' law-
yers get overcompensated for their efforts by way of attorneys' fee
awards set at higher than market rates.166 This deliberate overcom-
pensation is designed either to reward the putative creativity and tal-
ent of plaintiffs' lawyers or to implicitly compensate them for other
cases that they lose. If such methods of fee inflation were applied to
prevailing defense lawyers, there would be peals of outrage from los-
ing plaintiffs (and properly so). The logical outcome should be the
establishment of a single, consistent standard for lawyers on both
sides. Such a standard would almost certainly be less munificent than
the current plaintiff-only methods of calculating attorney's fees. In
Europe and elsewhere, where two-way loser-pays systems have been
adopted, standards appear to lean consistently toward "less-than-full"
fee compensation, at least in part to avoid the danger that lawyers or
litigants will overinvest in cases likely to prevail.1 67
164. For a time, some courts awarded attorneys' fees to losing plaintiffs based on the
language of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (1988); see, e.g., Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 484 F.2d 1331, 1338 (1973)
(awarding attorneys' fees to petitioners who were successful on some but not all of their
claims). The Supreme Court curbed this practice in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S.
680 (1983). The Ruckeishaus Court held it inappropriate for a federal court to award attor-
neys' fees under the Clean Air Act absent some success on the merits. Id. at 694. See
generally Ingrid Holmlund, Awards of Attorneys'Fees to Nonprevailing Parties under the Clean Air
Act, 59 WASH. L. REv. 585 (1984).
165. Pfennigstorf, supra note 1, at 46 (indicating that some European countries allow
attorney's fee awards to be apportioned if a party is only partially successful).
166. The lodestar method of determining attorney's fees involves multiplying the attor-
ney's reasonable number of hours by the reasonable hourly rate of a similarly skilled attor-
ney in the community. See Peter C. Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform,
12 YALEJ. ON REG. 435, 487 (1995). The downside of such a method is that sometimes it
"encourages attorneys to amass as many hours as possible-even by padding their hours or
rejecting favorable settlement offers." Id.; see also Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d
1261, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing both lodestar and percentage fee approaches and
endorsing the latter).
167. "Less-than-full" fee compensation is achieved in other two-way fee-shifting systems
through such mechanisms as: dividing disputes into specific claims and shifting fees only
for the claims upon which a party was successful, limiting fee-shifting to reasonable and
necessary expenditures, allowing losers to contest fees awarded as inflated, and providing
exceptions for unusually close cases, as well as through below-market hourly attorney reim-
bursements, exclusion of some expense categories from reimbursement, or both. Hearing
on Issues Related to Legal Reform Issues in the Contract with America Before the Subcomm. on Courts
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What is piquant about the arguments against two-way fee-shifting
is that virtually all of them apply equally to one-way fee-shifting. Some
argue that the prospect of fee indemnity is intolerable because even
good cases have a fluke chance of losing, and the prospect of paying
the resulting hefty legal fees would scare litigants with good cases into
bad settlements. On the other hand, if fear of fluke results has such
an effect, then it must do so not only when middle-class people sue
but also when they get sued.
A compendium of similar arguments against loser-pays offered by
Charles Tauman, executive director of the Oregon Trial Lawyers Asso-
ciation,168 could be repeated, point by point, as arguments against the
current one-way fee-shifting measures. Tauman declared that "unlim-
ited liability for fees [would] simply reward . . . extravagant expendi-
ture of legal expenses." 169 He opposed the "steep cliff" approach
under which losing a close case would mean incurring a full fee pen-
alty, rather than a token fee penalty if any.170 Finally, on the broadest
level, he declared that the risk of incurring a fee penalty for insisting
on trial placed an "unacceptable burden" on the constitutional right
to have one's dispute resolved by jury.' 7 '
In light of these rhetorical contradictions, legislators would do
well to present supporters of existing one-way fee-shifting laws with a
choice: you may have two-way fee-shifting, or no-way fee-shifting, but
the asymmetry must end. Take your pick.
The wider case for loser-pays draws out a similar inconsistency in
the arguments of defenders of our current litigation regime. Their
general stance is that a civil justice system should provide a remedy for
every right and, in particular, should require the members of every
(other) profession and business to pay for the harms they do in the
course of their profit-seeking.1 72 Supporters of the current fee regime
maintain that without the fullest measure of liability and the most gen-
erous measure of damages, injuries will go inadequately deterred and
victims inadequately compensated. 73
When the discussion turns to the injury inflicted by litigation it-
self, however, the arguments of supporters of the current system sud-
and InteUectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (state-
ment of Walter Olson); see also OLSON, supra note 7, at 330, 334-35.
168. See Tauman, supra note 99 (outlining arguments against a loser-pays system).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (discussing the values of the current civil justice system).
173. Id.
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denly shift.174 They acknowledge that exposure to liability can terrify
middle-class persons even when they have strong cases and that trial
outcomes can reflect not just objective merit but a large random fac-
tor.17 They also admit that well-meaning persons placed in danger of
open-ended legal jeopardy may suspend activities that are privately
profitable and sometimes socially useful.17  From this newly found
perspective, they recognize that a courtroom loss may mean only that
one's side was "outspent and outlawyered."1 77 This is a revealing ad-
mission about the nature of the system, and one that must be applied
equally to both opponents and proponents of loser-pays. With these
admissions on the table, it should be easier to gain sympathy for the
liability plight of accountants, 178 nurses,179 and charity volunteers.1s
For litigators, the challenge of loser-pays is a challenge to live by
the rules they prescribe for everyone else, namely paying for harm
done. If accountability for injury and deterrence of harm are such
noble goals, if justice must not be rationed, if compensation of tram-
pled-on innocents is worth any amount of disruption of the work of
those doing the trampling, why not compensate the people they in-
jure? If we ask these questions often enough, we may someday get our
answer.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Jeff Merrick, O.J. Simpson Trial Shows Perils of Oregon's Loser-Pays Law, ORErGONAN,
Oct. 7, 1995, at D7 (Letter to the Editor) (expressing dissatisfaction with the loser-pays
legislation enacted in Oregon in 1995).
178. See, e.g., Jodi B. Scherl, Comment, Evolution of Auditor Liability to Noncontractual
Third Parties: Balancing the Equities and Weighing the Consequences, 44 AM. U. L. RE,. 255, 257
(1994) (noting that many investors equate business failures with audit shortcomings and
attempt to make accountants liable for their losses).
179. See, e.g., Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908,
910 (1995) (discussing the effect of malpractice lawsuits on the reputation, well-being, and
insurance premiums of health care professionals).
180. See, e.g., Charles R. Tremper, Compensation for Harm from Charitable Activity, 76 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 401, 401-74 (1991) (exploring the potential liability of charitable organiza-
tions and their volunteers and advocating a charitable redress system).
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